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Here, I attempt to explore the interactions between evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayr and other biolo-
gists in the process that has been called the professionalizing of evolutioary biology, and in the de-
fence of organismal biology and of systematics. I will use the tool of quoting from original writings 
rather than paraphrasing them, since it is necessary to preserve the flavour of the arguments and 
controversies that Mayr was involved in, and that led to Mayr’s role in helping to build the edifice 
of evolutionary biology as it is known today. 
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A hundred years is but an instant in evolutionary time; 
however, during the life of Ernst Mayr (1904–2005) that 
spanned a century, significant progress was made in the 
understanding of the pattern and process of evolution. 
This article is a tour through the shifting contours of the 
intellectual landscape of evolutionary thought during Mayr’s 
lifetime. It will, however, be a selective tour because it will 
only highlight concepts and controversies that Mayr was 
either involved in, or those that are necessary to visit in order
to understand Mayr’s contributions to the study of evolution 
and his interactions with the practitioners of the biological 
sciences. Ernst Mayr was an ornithologist and systematist 
by training; he embraced Darwinism and championed the 
cause of evolutionary biology throughout his long and highly 
productive career. 
The conflict between biometry, Darwinism and 
Mendelism 
We begin the tour in the period between 1900 and 1918, when 
the genetic basis of biological traits was being understood. 
Although Mendel made his discoveries in the 1860s, he 
remained unknown until his re-d covery by Hugo de Vries, 
Carl Correns and Erich von Tschermark around 1900. This 
re-discovery led to the rise of the Mendelians who recorded 
variation in discontinuous biological traits in populations, 
viz. the colours of flowers or the shape of seeds, what in 
statistics would be known as categorical variables. At around 
that time also, the field of biometry was being developed 
in the UK, mainly by Darwin’s cousin Francis Galton (Natu-
ral I heritance, 1889), and by Karl Pearson (‘Contributions 
to the mathematical theory of evolution’, Journal of the 
Royal Statistcal Society, 1893). As the name suggests, bio-
metry is the measurement of biological traits in populations, 
and thus the examination of the distribution of population 
variation in these traits. Naturally, biometricians were only 
able to measure traits that exhibited continuous variation 
in populations, viz. height, and were thus on a collision course 
with the Mendelians who recorded discontinuous traits. 
Bio etricians did not believe that Mendel’s laws of inheri-
tance could be applied to continuous traits and thus they 
doubted the generality of Mendel’s findings. While the 
controversy between the Mendelians and the biometricians 
was on-going, there was concomitantly a rejection of Darwi-
ism by important founders of Mendelism such as William 
Bateson, Hugo de Vries and Wilhelm Johannsen. Why 
was this so? It was because Darwinism at that time meant 
gradual evolution, as annuciated by Darwin: ‘ ature does 
not make leaps’; modification by descent was via slow 
evolutionary change. The Mendelians who were obs rving 
discontinuous traits seemed to think that nature did indeed 
make leaps, and this formed the basis of the rejection of 
evolution by gradual steps. It thus appeared as if Darwin-
ism and Mendelism were incompatible. According to the his-
torian of science Sahotra Sarkar, this conflict was resolved 
by Ronald Aylmer Fisher, in an important paper in 1918. 
The paper1 dealt with similarities between r lated indi-
viduals. Here, Fisher assumed that continuous traits were 
determined by a large number of Mendelian factors, 
which mostly acted in ependent of each other. According to 
Sarkar, by doing so, Fisher reduced biometry to Men-
delism and thus broke the impasse between Mendelism and 
Darwinism2. Fisher’s crucial ssumption was empirically 
supported by work on Drosophila by researchers of the 
Morgan school who were also finding out, at about that 
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time, that small variations could be caused by Mendelian 
factors. This meant that all biological traits could come un-
der the purview of population genetics, which was an im-
portant development. This facilitated the synthesis of 
Darwinism, Mendelism and biometry3. 
The evolutionary synthesis begins 
Beginning in the 1920s, the classical genetics of Morgan was 
being integrated with disciplines such as cytology and enzy-
mology. Morgan’s The Theory of the Gene (1926) also 
played an important interdisciplinary role in this process. 
Evolutionary biology was also being put on a s r ng theo-
retical foundation with the work of what has been called the 
‘triumvirate’ – a set of three individuals whose contributions 
were quite different yet extremely significant. Fisher 
(1890–1962) believed that significant evolutionary change 
took place only in large populations, almost exclusively 
by natural selection on near-i dependent loci. He dis-
cussed this in his classic book The Genetical Theory of 
Natural Selection (1930). Sewall Wright (1889–1988) 
was more interested in the behaviour of genes in small 
populations or in small demes of larger populations. An 
important consequence of population substructure was the 
occurrence of random genetic drift in such small populations, 
which could result in non-adapted genotypes. Wright also 
formulated his famous shifting balance theory of evolu-
tion, which essentially provided a powerful heuristic tool 
to conceptualize the movement of populations over a  
adaptive landscape, from non-adapted valleys to more adapted 
peaks, a movement that could be brought ab t by a 
combination of mutation, migration and selection within 
and between populations. The third member of this select 
club was J.B.S. Haldane (1892–1 64) who, among many 
other issues, was concerned specifically with examining 
the time available for ev lution by natural selection to occur, 
given known mutation rates. A satisfactory theory of natural 
selection . . . must show not only that it can cause a spe-
cies to change, but that it can cause it to change at a rate 
which will account for present and past transmutations 
(‘A mathematical theory of natural and artificial selec-
tion’, Transactions of the Cambridge Philosophical Soci-
ety, 1924). It is often believed that the work of this troika 
was what was largely responsible for the modern evolu-
tionary synthesis. However, contributions by non-Angl -
US researchers should not be forgotten. Mayr and Theodo-
sius Dobzhansky were particularly careful later on to high-
light the efforts of Russian naturalist-gene icists who, for 
example, studied variation in natural populations of Dro-
sophila. Thus, they believed that the triumvirate should be 
extended to a quadrumvirate by the inclusion of Sergei 
Chetverikov (1880–1959), who proposed that mutions are 
not necessarily deleterious and that natural populations are 
a storehouse of mutations on which natural selection can act. 
[A] species, like a sponge, soaks up heterozygous muta-
tions, while remaining from first to last externally (phe-
notypically) homozygous (‘On several aspects of the 
evolutionary process from the view point of modern ge-
n t cs’, Zhurnal Eksperimental’noi Biologii, 1926). Chet-
verikov’s student, Timofeeff-Ressovksy went on to found a 
vibrant school of genetics in Germany. 
The public perception of natural selection and 
evolution: The response of evolutionary biologists 
The period of the 1920s was also a time when there was 
considerable dispute in the popular press among popular 
figures such as the pro-Darwinian H. G. Wells and the 
anti-Darwinian writers Hilaire Belloc, George Bernard 
Shaw and G. K. Chesterton. Criticism was directed against 
Wells’s Outline of History (1920) in which he depicted a 
materialistic progression of life on earth that also included the
evolution of human culture and society. The criticism was 
not so much against evolution, which was generally, by that 
time, accepted as a fact, as against the process of natural 
selection. The palaeontologist, Arthur Keith went on to 
declare in the Rationalist Annual in 1922: [The] very fact 
that Mr. Chesterton and Mr. Hilaire Belloc could confi-
dently assure readers of the Sunday Press that Darwin’s 
theory was dead, showed that those who are studying the 
evidence of our origin, and who are Darwinists to a man, 
had lost touch with public intelligence (quot d in Sarkar2). 
 It was the clarion call sounded by Keith that was taken 
up by Haldane, according to Sarkar2. Haldane wrote an 
essay in the Rationalist Annual defending Darwinism in 
1927. This was followed in 1932 by The Causes of Evolu-
tion4 – o e of the most important books on evolution for the 
intelligent layperson in which he said: Darwinism has 
been a subject of embittered controversy ever since its in-
ceptio . .  . The few really pertinent attacks were lost amid
a jabber of ecclesiastical bombinations. The criticism 
w s largely dictated by disgust or fear of this doctrine, 
nd it was natural that the majority of scientific men ral-
lied in Darwin’s support. By the time of Darwin’s death in 
1882, Darwin had become orthodox in biological circles. 
Th  next generation saw the beginnings of a more critical 
attitude among biologists. It was possible to criticise 
Darwin without being supposed to be supporting the literal 
authenticity of the Book of Genesis . . . . The rising genera-
tion of biologists, to which I belong, may now perhaps 
claim to make its voice heard. We have this advantage at 
least over our predecessors, that we get no thrill from at-
tacking either theological or biological orthodoxy; for 
eminent theologians have accepted evolution and eminent 
biologists denied natural selection. 
 Th  Causes of Evoluti n is an extremely valuable book, not 
only because it explains lucidly the processes contributing 
to evolution, but in an Appendix at the end, it gathered to-
gether all the then known mathematical models of popula-
tion genetics, providing a useful and scholarly source of 
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reference. It was clear that Haldane’s vision and concerns 
went much beyond the framework of population genetics and 
included all of evolution. This is why historians of science 
such as Sarkar, consider Haldane to be the most important 
member of the quadrumvirate and regard his efforts as re-
sulting in the constitution of an evolutionary genetics rather 
than just population genetics2. This broad integrative approach 
was not taken by either Fisher or Wright. Others, such as, 
Carson5 also believd that the evolutionary synthesis began 
in earnest with the approach of Haldane, that besides the work 
of Darwin, Mendel, Fisher and Wright, also brought in  
genetic phenomena such as inversions, translocations, 
polyploidy, hybridization, as well as discipline  such as pa-
laeontology. Haldane’s broad view of factors contributing 
to evolution and to its investigation was vital to the syn-
thesis. 
The modern evolutionary synthesis 
Beginning in the 1930s, the Jesup lecture series at Columbia 
University was influential in focusing the efforts of key scien-
tists who played an important role in professionalizing 
evolutionary biology. These scientists in America nd the 
books which resulted from their lectures in the series 
were Theodosius Dobzhansky: Genetics and the Origin of 
Species (1937), Ernst Mayr: Systematics and the Origin of 
Species from the Viewpoint of a Zoologist (1942), George 
Gaylord Simpson: Tempo and Mode in Evolution (1944) and 
G. Ledyard Stebbins: Variation and Evolution in Plants 
(1950). Julian Huxley (the grandson of T. H. Huxley) in 
England also played an extremely important role in this 
process in three ways. Firstly, in 1930, he co-authored a 
book entitled The Science of Life along with H. G. Wells and 
his son G. P. Wells. This book was a sequel to Wells’s 
earlier book, The Outline of History, which had caused 
much controversy because of its materialistic perspective. 
Secondly, in 1940, Huxley edited an important book entitled 
The New Systematics in which he said: Even a quarter cen-
tury ago it was possible to think of systematics as a spe-
cialized, rather narrow branch of biology, on the whole 
empirical and lacking in unifying principles, indispensa-
ble as a basis for all biological workers, but without much 
general interest or application to other branches of their 
science. Today, on the other hand, systematics has be-
come one of the focal points of biology. Here we can 
check our theories concerning selection and gene-spread 
against concrete instances, find material for innumerable 
experiments, build up new inductions: the world is our 
laboratory, evolution itself is our guinea pig. Thirdly, in 
1942, he wrote Evolution: The Modern Synthesis, wh ch 
was where, for thefirst time, he used the term ‘modern syn-
thesis’ for the process that was occurring among the evolu-
tionary biologists wherein conflicts between geneticists and 
naturalist-systematists were being resolved.  
 It is beyond the scope of this article for me to summarize
the content of all these books. Since our focus is on Mayr, 
I will summarize the central idea of his 1942 book and thus 
of his intellectual contribution at that time. Although the title 
seems quite innocuous, Mayr’s 1942 book is a powerful 
statement, as was Huxley’s, in the cause of protecting the 
intellectual status of systematics as well as of systematists. 
It makes the point that, although Darwin’s 1859 opus was 
calledOn the Origin of Species, Darwin himself did not 
hav  a species concept and neither adequately defined a 
species nor the process of species formation. For example, 
in 1859 Darwin said: In determining whether a form should 
be ranked as a species or a variety, the opinion of natural-
ists having sound judgement and wide experience seems 
the only guide to follow. And: [T]he only distinction be-
tween species and well-marked varieties is, that the latter 
are known, or believed, to be connected at the present day
by intermediate forms, whereas species were formerly 
thus connected. Therefore, Mayr set out both to define a 
species as well as to bring together known mechanisms of 
speciation. The species concept that appealed most to Mayr 
was that of the biological species wherein species are d-
fined as ‘groups of actually or potentially interbreeding 
natural populations, which are reproductively isolated 
from other such groups’6. Furthermore, in this book he ap-
plauded Julian Huxley’s use of the term ‘New Systematics’ 
in which ‘the importance of the species as such is reduced, 
since most of the actual work is done with subdivisions of 
the species, such as subspecies and populations. The popula-
tion or rather an adequate sample of it, . . . has become the 
basic taxonomic unit’6. The process of speciation that Mayr 
thoug t was most plausible was that of allopatric speci-
ation wherein a once continuous population of a species 
may become split into two or more geographically isolated 
populations; these isolated populations may achieve reproduc-
tive isolation in allopatry such that when they later meet in 
sympatry, they are already separate species incapable of i -
terbreeding. It is important to remember, however, that 
these ideas of sympatric and allopatric species, of the bio-
logical species concept, as well as of reproductive isolating 
mechanisms had already been articulated by the lepidop-
terist E. B. Poulton7–9, in papers that date back to 1904. What 
Mayr, however, achieved in his remarkable book6 was a 
synthesis of thought on species concepts and not much 
original work itself; he brought his vast experience on the 
systematics of birds to bear on the field of systematics and 
was able to successfully couple it with the various species 
concepts available at that time. Perhaps one original contribu-
tion of Mayr in this regard was a 1954 paper in which he 
proposed peripatric speciation10. Mayr11 claims that in this 
paper he was the first to develop a detailed model of the 
connection between speciation, evolutionary rates and 
macroevolution. The 1954 paper was also apparently his 
favourite one12. In this paper, he proposed that founders 
from peripheral parts of the populati n of a species could, 
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if isolated for a sufficiently long time, form separate species. 
However, the rate of evolution and probability of speciation 
in such peripheral isolates would also be determined by the 
size of the founding population.  
 The main features of the evolutionary sy thesis thus 
came to be established. These were firstly, that gradual evolu-
tion (Darwinian evolution) could be explained by muta-
tions and recombination; secondly, that natural selection 
was an important force that could influence the pattern of 
genetic variation, and thirdly, that macro-evolutionary 
processes, i.e. speciation, could be explained by known 
genetic mechanisms. Mayr was certainly an important 
contributor to the synthesis, and surely one of its principal 
architects. In an edited volume in 1980 entitled The Evolu-
tionary Synthesis: Perspectives on the Unification of Bi-
ology, he had this to say about the intellectual process 
that was taking place during this period: When I read what 
was written by both sides [experimental geneticists and 
population-naturalists] during the 1920s, I am appalled 
at the misunderstandings, the hostility, and the intolerance 
of the opponents . . . Just as in the case of warring nations, 
intermediaries were needed . . . [T]hese bridge builders 
were the real architects of he synthesis. What qualifica-
tions did an evolutionist require to be able to serve as a 
bridge builder?  . . . None of the bridge builders was a 
narrow specialist. They all had, so to speak, a foot in 
several camps.  
Ernst Mayr and the Fisher–Wright debate 
In the above quotation, Mayr was describing the role that he 
felt was played by scientists such as himself, Dobzhansky, 
Stebbins, Simpson, and Huxley, i.e. the ‘inner circle’ who 
would remain closely connected by their strong commit-
ment to the cause of championing Darwinism. In the quote, 
Mayr mentions intolerance and misunderstanding, and it 
is therefore important, from a historical perspective also, 
to understand the role that Mayr played in an important 
debate that has been called the Fisher–Wr g t debate, be-
cause it involved a major argument between Fisher and 
Wright, a veritable clash of titans. The argument was basi-
cally over differences in perspective between Fisher and 
Wright, as to which was the most important evolutionary 
force: natural selection or random genetic drift. On one 
side was ranged Fisher and the ecological geneticist E. B. 
Ford, who wanted to use data on the moth Panaxia
dominula, which was found in two small populations 
around Oxford, to demonstrate the importance of natural 
selection. Using the small Panaxia populations, Fisher 
and Ford wanted to show that natural selection could be 
an important force even in such small populations and 
that drift was not necessarily the major evolutionary force 
within small populations. They were upst by Wright’s 
criticisms of natural selection in Huxley’s 1940 book The 
New Systematics, and in 1947 wrote a paper using the 
Panaxia data to counter this viewpoint. Dobzhansky, who 
saw this paper in Heredity, wrote to Wright in 1948 and 
implored him to reply to what he saw as an attack against 
Wright’s theory of genetic drift. I think you should pub-
lish a retort, not for your own sake but for the sake of the 
mu titude which Fisher deliberately leads astray. Per-
haps a note in Nature will do the trick, or is a more ex-
t nded statement desirable? (quoted in Provine13). 
Stebbins also suggested that Wright publish his response 
to the Fisher–Ford paper in the journal Evolution. Why 
the j urnal Evolution? This was because Mayr had just been 
elec ed in 1947 as the first Editor of this newly estab-
lished journal, which was supposed to be the mouthpiece 
of the Society for the Study of Evolution (SSE)14. [The 
f unding of the SSE was also an important event in the 
fessionalizing of evolutionary biology, as it arose as a 
merger of the Society for the Study of Speciation and the 
Committee on Common Problems in Genetics, Paleontol-
ogy, and Systematics. Through his important organiza-
ti nal role in this society, which also included serving as 
the Society’s Secretary and as Editor of Evolution, Mayr 
played a vital part in the ‘confederation’ of scientists 
working towards an integration of disciplines in evolu-
tionary biology15.] Wright accordingly did submit this 
paper to Evolution, and it was accepted by Mayr. On see-
ing this article, Ford wrote the following to Mayr in 1949 
(quoted in Provine13): I  . . .have seen the article by S. 
Wright in Evolution in which he criticises a paper by 
Fisher and myself in Heredity. It is, I think, not normally 
worth replying to criticism. The only circumstances in 
which this should be done are if others are likely seri-
ously to be misled, or in the rare event in which one’s 
view  are actually misrepresented. In respect of Wright’s 
criticism, both reasons hold. Consequently, Fisher and I 
have drafted a note briefly exposing Wright’s misrepre-
sentation of our statements and we should be so grateful 
if you could publish it in Evolution . . . . 
 This is what Mayr had to say in response (quoted in 
Provine13): I entirely agree with you that misrepresenta-
tion of fact as well as misquotations should be corrected. 
The pages of Evolution will always be open to such objec-
tive correction. Consistent with this policy, I would be 
glad to publish your note if, as you state, it would prevent 
that ‘others are . . . seriously . . . misled’. However, it seems 
to me that in its present form your note fails to achieve 
this object . . . With the same breath you say that random 
fixation occurs but that it is of no evolutionary significance. 
I have always considered it axiomatic that anything that 
leads to a deviation from the present generation is auto-
matically of evolutionary significance. I fail to see any 
ref tation of this point in your note . . . As editor, I am in-
tereste in any discussion that leads to a clarification of 
 scientific problem. On the other hand, I am sure that 
the Editorial Board would never endorse a communica-
tion that might lead to a polemic. My personal impression 
is that the note, submitted by you, was written in haste 
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and perhaps under some emotional stress. I would do you 
a great disservice by publishing it in its present form. I 
am therefore returning it to you for consideration . . . 
Fisher withdrew the paper from Ev lution and submitted 
it to Heredity, where it was published as ‘The Sewall Wright 
Effect’ in 1950. In this paper, the dichotomy between those 
who accept and those who reject random genetic drift as a 
major force in evolution was clearly outlined. Wright 
wrote a counter-paper in American Scientist in 1952 enti-
tled ‘Fisher and Ford on “The Sewall Wright Effect”’16. 
However, he also added a note on selection in this paper 
(quoted in Provine13): I do not, of course, wish to maintain 
that my views on evolution have stood entirely still since 
1931 . . . Qualifications and additions have been mad , 
beginning in 1932, and have continued up to the present 
time. The interplay of directed and random processes in 
populations of suitable structure has, however, continued to 
be the central theme. Why did Mayr champion Wright’s 
cause against the views of Fisher in this debate? According 
to Provine13, if Fisher and Ford’s conclusions on the impor-
tance of natural selection in the small P. dominula popu-
lations were found to be true, then it could undermine 
Mayr’s central idea of the founder effect in speiation. 
This founder effect relied on small population effects such 
as random genetic drift as important factors in generating 
population differentiations that could result in speciation.  
Mayr and the controversy over beanbag  
genetics 
Another major contr versy that Mayr was involved in was
on the importance of ‘classical’ population genetics. Be-
ginning in the 1950s, there appeared to be a disenchant-
ment with the contributions of the troika of population 
geneticists consisting of Fisher–Wright–Haldane, and their 
relevance to ‘real’ evolution, viz. evolution as observed 
in nature. This disenchantment was largely the result of a 
conflict among experimental biologists, naturalist-systematists 
and theoreticians. For example, the developmental biolo-
gist C. H. Waddington had this to say on the matter in 
1952, in a Society of Experimental Biology Symposium in 
Oxford (as quoted in Provine13): The mathematical theories 
of Fisher, Haldane and Wright ‘[have] not, in the first 
place led to any noteworthy quantitative satem nts about 
evolution. The formulae involve parameters of selective 
advantage, effective population size, migration and muta-
tion rates, etc., most of which are still too inaccurately 
known to enable quantitative predictions to be made or 
verified’. Dobzhansky, on the other hand, seemed to un-
derstand the great value of theoretical formulations, even 
though, as we will see later, he apparently did not under-
stand all of it fully. This is what Dobzhansky had to say 
about population genetics in the Cold Spring Harbor Sympo-
sium on Population Genetics in 1955 (quoted in Provine13):
Haldane, Wright, and Fisher are the pioneers of population 
genetics whose main research equipment was paper and 
ink rather than microscopes, experimental fields, Droso-
phila bottles, or mouse cages. This is theoretical biology 
at its best, and it has provided a guiding light for rigor-
ous quantitative experiment and observation. Mayr was, 
however, not convinced, and in the 1955 Cold Spring Harbor 
Sympo ium Session on Integration of Genotypes had this 
to say (quoted in Provine13): The study of the integration 
of genotypes has shown that population genetics can no 
longer operate with the simplified concepts it started out 
with. In this symposium, Mayr spoke strongly of the limita-
tio s of theoretical population genetics and praised the 
contributions of field naturalists who were doing the ‘real’ 
biology. This talk was the forerunner to the beanbag genetics 
controversy. In 1959, Mayr gave a plenary talk at the Cold 
Spring Harbor Symposium organized on the occasion of the 
celebration of 100 years after the publication of Darwin’s 
Origin of Species. In this talk entitled ‘Where are we?’, 
Mayr divided progress in evolution into the following pe-
riods13. There was first the Mendelian period (1900–20) 
dominated by the mutation theory of evolution. This was 
followed (1920–30s) by the period of classical population 
genetics à la Fisher-Wright–Haldane, which was largely 
characterized by the belief in natural selection by gradual 
incremental ‘Darwinian’ processes, but also by the extremely 
simplistic view that evolutionary change was essentially 
an input or output of genes, i.e. beanbag genetics. This led 
to the phase of the so-called newer population genetics 
(late 1930–59) guided by naturalist-population geneticists 
such as Dobzhansky, Bruce Wallace and Michael Lerner. 
In his plenary address, Mayr seemed to be saying that 
theoretical population genetics, especially of the ‘classical’ 
kind could go only so far and no more, and by terming it 
‘beanbag genetics’, he appeared to be disparaging it and 
attempting to elevate the genetics of individuals such as 
Dobzhansky to a higher, more relevant status compared 
to that of the classicists. In this context, it is interesting to 
examine comments made by Dobzhansky on Wright’s 
papers, as it provides insight into the conceptual divide 
between the naturalist-geneticists and the theoretical popul-
ion geneticists. Here are some extracts from the Oral His-
tory Memoir of Dobzhansky (1962; quoted in Provine13): 
Wright gave a splendid paper at the Genetics Congress in 
1932 [the Shifting Balance Theory]. In a sense, that is 
still his best paper. He is a remarkably difficult writer. In 
most cases, he writes with so much profound and esoteric 
mathematics that common mortals cannot re d him any-
how. Even when he attempts to write without esoteric 
thematics, he is often rather hard to follow. This 1932 
paper is an exception . . . My way of reading Sewall 
Wright’s papers, which I think is perfectly defensible, is 
to read the conclusions he arrives at, and hope to good-
ness that what comes in between is correct. ‘Papa knows 
best’ is a reasonable assumption, because if the mathe-
matics were incorrect, some mathematician would have 
found it out.  
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 Dobzhansky was clearly in awe of Wright, and through 
most of his professional career collaborated actively with 
him, a situation that some believe began to become oner-
ous to Wright in later years since it was rather one-
sided13. Mayr, on the other hand, seemed to be clamouring 
for the recognition of naturalists, systematists and such 
ilk in the history of progress in evolutionary thought. In the 
Cold Spring Harbor Darwin Centennial in 1959, he said 
(quoted in Provine13): [Fisher, Wright and Haldane] have
worked out an impressive mathematical theory of geneti-
cal variation and evolutionary change. But what, precisely, 
has been the contribution of this mathematical school to 
evolutionary theory, if I may be permitted to ask such a 
provocative question? . . . However, I should perhaps 
leave it to Fisher, Wright, and Haldane to point out what 
they consider their major contributions. 
In defence of beanbag genetics 
It was inconceivable that Mayr’s remarks about beanbag 
genetics would remain unanswered. Wright reviewed the 
symposium volume that resulted from this Darwin Centennial 
at Cold Spring Harbor for the Am rican Journal of Human 
Genetics, and spent almost the entire review criticizing 
Mayr’s comments on beanbag geneticists. In this review, 
Wright, however, praised Dobzhansky as one who seemed 
to have truly understood the value of interaction between 
empiricism and theory. Mayr did not confine this attack 
against beanbag genetics to his plenary address, but also 
wrote about it in his 1963 book, Animal Species and Evolu-
tion. By this time, Haldane was in India and missed the 
1959 Cold Spring Harbor Symposium, as he was denied a 
visa to visit the US because of his Communist beliefs (a relic 
of the McCarthy era). He had also read the remarks about 
beanbag genetics in Mayr’s 1963 book which he was re-
viewing for the Journal of Genetics. In 1964, Haldane wrote 
his celebrated paper entitled ‘A defense of beanbag genet-
ics’17. This classic paper is essential reading for students 
of evolution because in it Haldane proceeds to demolish 
the opposition, with characteristic wit and satire. I repro-
duce a few extracts from this paper to provide a flavour 
of Haldane’s counter-attack: Now, in the first place I deny 
that the mathematical theory of population genetics is at all 
impressive, at least to a mathematician.  . . .Our mathemat-
ics may impress zoologists but do not greatly impress 
mathematicians . . . One of the most important functions 
of beanbag genetics is to show what kind of numerical 
data are needed. Their collection will be expensive. Inso-
far as Professor Mayr succeeds in convincing the politi-
cians and business executives who control research 
grants that beanbag genetics are misleading, we shall not 
get the data . . . . Perhaps a future historian may write, ‘If 
Fisher, Wright, Kimura, and Haldane had devoted more 
energy to exposition and less to algebraical acrobatics, 
American, British, and Japanese genetics would not have 
been eclipsed by those of Cambodia and Nigeria about 
AD 2000’. I have tried in this essay to ward off such a 
verdict. Haldane passed away in 1964, the year this paper 
was published. 
 What might one make of all of this polemic? Did Mayr 
truly believe that population genetics was not terribly 
useful in the progress of evolutionary thought? Perhaps 
this quote18 from Mayr’s book The Growth of Biological 
Thought may provide some insight: My tactic is to make 
sw eping categorical statements. Whether or not this is a 
fault, in the free world of the interchange of scientific ideas, 
is debatable. My own feeling is that it leads more quickly 
to the ultimate solution of scientific problems than a cau-
tious sitting on the fence . . . histories should even be po-
lemical. Such histories will arouse contradiction and they 
will challenge the reader to come up with a refutation. By 
a dialectical process this will speed up a synthesis of per-
spective.  
Ernst Mayr and the defence of organismal biology 
Mayr pl yed another important role in evolutionary biology, 
specifically in the defence of organismal biology. After the 
discovery of the structure of DNA in 1953, the 1950s and 
1960s saw the rise of molecular biology. With the arrival 
of James Watson as a member of the Harvard faculty in 1956, 
th  organismal or the non-molecular biologists were, in 
the words of E. O. Wilson ‘forced by the threat [of molecular 
biology] to rethink our intellectual legitimacy’ (quoted in 
Dietrich19). Statements such as ‘all biology is molecular’ 
made by the Nobel laureate and biochemist George Wald,  
s emed to reinforce the view that organismal biology was 
being perceived as not keeping up with the Watsons19. 
Mayr, Dobzhansky and Simpson began a counter-attack 
on molecular biology. They attempted to do so by speaking 
out for organismal biology at various forums and also by 
writing in important journals such as S ience. Mayr wrote 
an impassioned piece entitled ‘Cause and effect in biology. 
Kinds of causes, predictability, and teleology are viewed by 
a practising biologist’ in Science in 1961. In this essay, 
he outlined the difference between proximate and ultimate 
causation in biology. Molecular biology may provide, for 
example, a proximate cause for biological phenomena; 
however, the ultimate and most important causation was 
provided by natural selection. In a similar vein, Dob-
zhansky wrote about Cartesian versus Darwinian science, 
with Cartesian science being defined as the mechanistic 
aspect of a science like biology, while the Darwinian ap-
proach to science was said to provide the vera causa. 
Simpson20 also followed with a paper in the same style. 
The central goal of Mayr, Dobzhansky and Simpson was 
to establish that organismal biology was unique and 
autonomous, since it was neither deducible from nor reduci-
ble o molecular biology. Dobzhansky’s well-known say-
ing: Nothing makes sense in biology except in the light of 
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evolution, appeared in his paper entitled ‘Biology, molecular 
and organismic’ in the American Zoologist n 1964. Ac-
cording to the philosopher and historian of science, Michael 
Ruse (in an on-line eulogy for Ernst Mayr, 5 February 
2005)21: When Dobzhansky said that nothing in biology 
makes sense exc pt in the light of evoluti n, he was not 
just making an epistemological claim. He was making a 
political statement. A war cry to rally the troops. 
 Mayr attempted to do even more. In 1963, he wrote an 
editorial in the journal Science22, entitled The new versus 
the classical in science1. I provide some quotes from this 
paper to illustrate the tone and the type of points he was 
making; furthermore, although he was attacking molecular 
biology, the word molecular biology itself did not appear; 
yet all who read the paper knew the target of Mayr’s attack. 
There long has been a bandwagon tendency in American 
science, but today it seems particularly rampant . . . . In 
addition, there is an inclination to equate ‘classical’ with 
‘old-fashioned’ and ‘passé’ . . . We Americans worship the 
new: . . . Somehow the word new has acquired the mean-
ing of ‘better’ . . . [T]he Young Turks in the new areas . . . 
tend to regard the more classical branches of their science 
with unconcealed contempt. At worst, this intolerance 
leads them to attempt to cut-off f nds from the more clas-
sical fields . . . . 
 Dobzhansky and Mayr were also having difficulty in 
reconciling new findings of molecular biology with or-
ganismal biology. These finding seemed to indicate that 
the rate of change of molecules was much higher than the 
rate of change of morphology. Furthermore, the rate of 
evolution at the molecular level seemed to be constant, e.g. 
the work of Linus Pauling and Emile Zuckerkandl on 
haemoglobins and sickle cell anaemia was revealing that the 
rate of amino acid change in primates was constant23. This 
disjunction between molecules and morphology was hard 
to explain. To hold onto the view that organismal biology 
was an autonomous discipl ne which is not predictable 
from lower levels, Dobzhansky also wrote a paper in Sci-
ence in 1963 entitled ‘Evolutionary and population genetics: 
Active and intellectually stimulating research is going on in 
organismic as well as molecular genetics’ in which he 
said: Man is an organism, not a molecule, although some 
diseases which afflict his flesh are molecular diseases. 
Mayr and neutral evolution 
The ensuing paradox between molecular and morphological 
evolution was resolved by the brilliant insight of Motoo 
Kimura24 as well as by King and Jukes25, who declared 
that ‘non-Darwinian’ evolution took place at the molecular 
level. By this was meant that neutral substitutions or neutral 
mutations could occur at the molecular level. These mutations 
had no impact on the functionality, for example, of the 
protein in whose gene they occurred. This could happen, 
for instance, by mutations occurring in non-codi g sites 
of the gene or in non-functional parts of the protein. Kimura 
formalized these ideas in the neutral theory of evolution 
in 1968, and this theory has been hailed as one of the most 
important insights on evolution at the molecular level that 
the 20th century has seen. According to Zuckerkandl19, 
Mayr, Dobzhansky and Simpson were more ‘irritated’ by 
molecular biologists than by molecular evolution. They were 
trying to forge a secure relationship between organismal 
bi logy and molecular biology, such that the two could be 
successfully integrated. Central to this p sition was the issue 
of natural selection: on what did natural selection act? Ac-
cording to these three advocates, natural selection acted 
only on the organismal level. This continual advocacy 
must have had some effect because Zuckerkandl26 did admit 
that: The further away we get in the series of integrated 
biological levels from the gene level, the more disturbance 
is caused by environmental effects with respect to the un-
mbiguous expression of the structure of a given gene. 
The issues of levels of selection and of reductionism in biol-
ogy re still important topics of debate in biology. Thus 
even today, many decades after Mayr’s initial advocacy, 
biologists still feel compelled to write papers entitled ‘The 
return of the whole organism’27. 
 On the matter of neutral evolution, Mayr was still ex-
tremely ambivalent, and in his 1971 book Populations, 
Species, and Evolution, he had this to say: A random re-
placement of amino acids unquestionably occurs occa-
sionally in evolution, but it appears at present that it does 
not anywhere near approach selection in importance as 
an evolutionary factor. In his opinion, chance caused di-
order, while selection caused order. The evolutionary biolo-
gist, Mark Ridley has remarked that in an essay Mayr wrote 
in 2004 in Science on the occasion of his 100th birthday, he 
summarized the importance of the neutral theory of evo-
lution by failing to mention it. In this essay entitled ‘80 years 
of watching the evolutionary scenery’, Mayr28 goes on to say: 
It would seem justified to assert that, so far, no revision of 
the Darwinian paradigm has become necessary as a con-
sequence of the spectacular discoveries of molecular bio-
logy. 
Epilogue 
Mayr has justifiably earned for himself the title ‘Darwin of 
the 20th century’. He declared himselfDarwin’s champion, 
and often pointed out that a most important consequence 
of the D rwinian revolution was the destruction of typological 
thinking. Mayr repeatedly stressed that there were important 
differences between Darwinism and contemporary theo-
ries of evolution. Evolution as conceived by Darwin was 
not goal-directed, while contemporary theories were or-
th genetic or aristogenetic in the sense that they believed 
in a pr-determined progression of lower to higher forms. 
Furth rmore, by focusing on individuals, Darwin destroyed 
the tyranny of typological thinking, which was a relic of the
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essentialism of Plato, who believed that groups of organ-
isms were constructed according to certain homogenei-
ties18. By attacking the concept of essentialism, Darwin 
provided a mechanism by which individuals became both 
a focus and an essential ingredient in the evolutionary proc-
ess. This was a paradigm shift, and according to Mayr18, a 
conceptual leap, that constituted a true scientific revolu-
tion. Mayr’s zeal in defending Darwin and in protecting 
organismal biology and evolution from the ‘non-believers’ 
has formed the subject of this entire review, but it can also 
be seen in the titles of some of his recent books, e.g. One 
Long Argument. Charles Darwin and the Genesis of 
Modern Evolutionary Thought (1991), This is Biology – 
The Science of the Living World (1997), and What Evolu-
tion Is (2002). In a eulogy for Ernst Mayr21, Michael 
Ruse had this to say: Those dreadful geneticists had ig-
nored variation, the basis of Mayr's gradualism, and so a 
lot of the history [The Growth of Biological Thought, 
Mayr, 1982] was devoted to showing that that rotter Plato 
had illicitly introduced essentialism – the idea that groups 
have no varit on – into biological thought. Only slowly 
and gradually, thanks primarily to Darwin and to a cer-
tain immigrant to the United States of America, had popula-
tion thinking finally triumphed. 
 On the occasion of Mayr’s 90th birthday, Douglas Futu-
yma29 wrote in the journal Evolution in a special section 
to honour Mayr: He may be given to categorical asser-
tions that provoke or irritate; he may fight battles we 
suppose were long since won, but which we can hardly 
appreciate (because he helped to win them for us); his in-
terpretations of genetic theory and evidence are some-
times questionable; and no one will agree with all his 
positions, analyses, and opinions. But that his style de-
mands counter-argument is itself one of the reasons to 
read him . . . . Anyone who has failed to read Mayr can 
hardly claim to be educated in evolutionary biology. 
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